Dasein

RELATED TERMS: Design, Entwurf, Entwerfen; Storyworld; Everyday; Present-at-hand (Vorhanden) and Ready-to-hand (Zuhanden); Lifeworld – Lebenswelt – Umwelt; Modernism; Philosophy; Sloterdijk; Heidegger; Nietzsche

“There is a Dasein whose thrownness consists precisely in the overcoming of its thrownness.”

Herbert Marcuse (2005, 1928: 32).

As one particular understanding or interpretation of ‘lifeworld’ or ‘being-in-the-world’ or, indeed, the everyday, the notion of Dasein may be of particular interest in the design and understanding of narrative environments. It may also be of use in seeking to grasp the character of human action, whether understood in the form of will, agency, performativity or actantiality, in the context of an articulated narrative world (diegesis, storyworld) and lifeworld (e.g. actant-network ontology or actant-rhizome ontology).

Dasein is a German word that translates literally as ‘there [da] being [Sein]’ or ‘being there’. While Dasein’s root meaning is usually rendered in English as ‘Being there’, it is equally valid to translate it as ‘Being-here’. Dasein means inhabiting and existing as a Here, a site within which Being and beings can meaningfully appear (Fried and Polt, 2014: xi).

In everyday German, the word Dasein is used just as the word ‘existence’ is used in English. However, Heidegger viewed the Latin term existentia as misleading and superficial. In Being and Time (1927) Heidegger, gives the term a specific philosophical significance. Prior to Heidegger, Dasein commonly referred to the being of persons. Heidegger follows and intensifies the common usage.

Dasein is defined in Being and Time as that being for whom Being itself is at issue, for whom Being, especially its own Being, is in question. For the most part, for Heidegger, this being is the human being although, as Fried and Polt (2014: xi) note, Dasein not simply equivalent to humans. It may help to think of Dasein, Fried and Polt suggest, as a condition into which human beings enter, either individually or collectively, at a historical juncture when the Being of beings becomes an issue for them, or Being as the event of meaningful disclosure takes place for them.

As distinct from the mode of being of a present-at-hand entity (object or artefact) or a ready-to-hand entity (tool or instrument), Dasein is by existing as a self-related being, for whom its own Being, as an individuality through a collectivity, is at issue as it goes about inhabiting the world. Each of us interacts with artefacts, instruments and other human beings in terms of some possible ways for us to be, such as being a doctor, being a teacher, being a parent or being a craftsperson.

Usually, we do not choose our identity, but behave in the way ‘one’ does in the community to which one belongs. In short, one conforms to (or struggles with) the norm. However, experiences such as anxiety and the call of conscience can shock or provoke one into choosing who one is, in the face of one’s own mortality. One then exists ‘authentically’, at least for a time.

An authentic individual, in this account, lives in a way that is appropriate to a temporal being, a being who has always already been thrown into some situation, who projects possibilities, and who dwells among other beings in a present world. Our temporality is historical, as each of us is a member of a community with a shared inheritance. Through communicating and struggling (agonism), a people or community may find a way to forge a future from its past (Fried and Polt, 2014: xii).

Mitcham (2001: 28) explains Dasein in the following terms,

“Heidegger undertakes an extended phenomenological analysis of human experience, concluding that Dasein is being-in-the-world characterized existentially as care, concern, solicitude – both about its own being and about the being of the world. That is, underlying all of Dasein’s modes of being and fundamental to it is the experience of care or worry, uncertainty.”

While this general orientation to Dasein may be accepted, in which matters of fact are understood simultaneously as matters of concern, to adopt a Latourian (2004) expression, difficulties arise in the interpretation of what Heidegger means by saying that Dasein is a question of ‘being-thrown’.

Thus, Mitcham (2001: 29), for example, argues that when Heidegger hyphenates the German word Da-sein, he does so in order to emphasise the specificity, as this-ness or there-ness, of the human as that which finds itself thrown into a particular body, dwelling in this country, now at this specific historical period, as well as the care or concern that arises in the specific human being about so finding itself.

Basing himself on the assumption that this is what Heidegger suggests that the term Da-sein implies, Mitcham contends that only from such ineluctable particularity may one be truly human, may one think authentically. It is this sense of grounded being or being-in-the-world, in an individual body, in a unique place, and with an exclusive history, that Mitcham emphasises by adopting the term.

Peter Sloterdijk attempts a similar specification of the notion of Dasein when he argues that ‘being thrown into the world’, is to be thrown into an envelope of some kind, To define humans is to define the envelopes, the life support systems, that make it possible for them to breathe, to live.

Such interpretations, however, assume that the condition of ‘being thrown’ implies a sense of ‘being thrown into the world’, rather than a more prolonged contingency, i.e. simply that of being in a condition of thrownness, without cessation, without origin, without arrival, without destination, without telos, or without ground, so to speak.

This may lead to a further interpretation of the sense of anxiety of which Heidegger speaks, in that the human subject may recognise both its groundedness, in a specific body, in a specific place with a specific history, and its groundlessness, as an unending passage of being-as-thrownness. Expressing the matter in this way opens it to a potential relationship with some postmodernist writings, i.e. post-high-modernist or post-1945 writings. For example, Samuel Beckett and other authors of the literature of the absurd, undertook to subvert the foundations of accepted modes of thought and experience so as to reveal the meaninglessness of existence and the underlying “abyss,” or “void,” or “nothingness” on which any supposed security is conceived to be precariously suspended (Abrams, 1999: 168-169).

In Nietzsche’s (2010) terms, “My humanity is a constant self-overcoming.” In other words, as Golding (2014: 218) glosses, “This, and nothing less, are the here/now groundless grounds of one’s humanity; a used, slightly soiled present-tense ‘is’…”.

This Nietzschean ‘self-overcoming’ is being interpreted here as a self-overthrowing, a constant ‘designing’ and ‘re-designing’, developed through a particular understanding of the Heideggerian structural movement of thrown-ahead-and-returning in terms of existential thrown-openness (“thrown projectedness”: geworfener Entwurf). In terms of design practices, such a characterisation of the human condition resonates with Manzini (2015) who considers that, in the 21st century, we are living in “a world in which everybody constantly has to design and redesign their existence”.

Although Heidegger would not use this terminology, the ground-less groundedness of Dasein lies in its inter-subjectivity and inter-corporeality. Thus, as Dalmayr (1989: 393) writes, the “worldliness” of Dasein entails inter-human linkage, an aspect discussed in Being and Time under the heading of “co-being”, of “being-with”, or Mitsein. Heidegger repeatedly insists in Being and Time that the ontological construal of being-in-the-world implies that the world is, “always a world already shared with others: the world of Dasein is a co-world; being-in signifies a co-being with others.” (Dallmayr, 1989: 394)

References

Abrams, M.H. (1999). A Glossary of Literary Terms, 7th ed. Boston, MA: Heinle & Heinle.

Dallmayr, F. (1989). The discourse of modernity: Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger (and Habermas). Praxis International, 8 (4), 377–406.

Fried, G. and Polt, R. (2014). Translators’ introduction to the second edition. In: Introduction to metaphysics, 2nd ed., by Martin Heidegger_._ New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Golding, J. (2014) Ecce Homo Sexual: Ontology and Eros in the Age of Incompleteness and Entanglement, Parallax, 20 (3), pp. 217–230. doi: 10.1080/13534645.2014.927628.

Latour, B. (2004). Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern. Critical Inquiry, 30 (2), 225–248.

Manzini, E. (2015) Design, when everybody designs: An introduction to design for social innovation. Translated by R. Coad. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Marcuse, H. (2005, 1928) Contributions to a phenomenology of historical materialism, in Wolin, R. and Abromeit, J. (eds) Heideggerian Marxism. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, pp. 1–33.

Mitcham, C. (2001). Dasein versus design: the problematics of turning making into thinking. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 11 (1), 27–36. Available from http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1011282121513 [Accessed 20 August 2014]

Nietzsche, F (2010). Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufman New York: Vintage Books, Section 4, p.218 and Section 8, p.223

Daoism

USE for: Taoism

RELATED TERMS:

The notion of dao (tao), in as far as it indicates a path, a way or a set of principles, may have importance for considering the kind of pathway or passage that occurs in a narrative environment. Also, reference to the dao is important in highlighting that a narrative environment is always, to some extent, a learning environment, because, as the Xueji (On Teaching and Learning) asserts, “A person will never come to understand the Dao without learning”. Similarly, engagement with or participation in a narrative environment involves learning.

As Di (2016: 45) explains, the character dao literally means the road one travels, but it also signifies the journey one takes in life. Furthermore, dao signifies a holistic conception of humans and nature, a humanistic worldview that forms the basis of ancient Chinese thought. The term dao (tao) is very widely used in ancient Chinese philosophical texts. From its literal meaning of ‘way’ or ‘path’, it is a short step to its use to mean ‘way of doing something’ and hence to mean ‘principle’ or ‘set of principles’. (Wilkinson, 1997: viii)

It is in the sense of ‘set of principles’ that it is used in the Analects of Confucius. To follow the dao in Confucian terms is to follow the set of moral principles expounded in that text (Wilkinson, 1997: viii). For Confucius, the essence of education is to study, pursue and live the dao, and to teach and learn holistically (Di, 2016: 45).

In order to effect a translation of the principles of the dao into human daily learning, experience and existence, Xueji, like many Chinese classic writings, advocates the cultivation of character and moral development (Di, 2016: 47).

While, in Daoism, the term ‘Dao’ is used to mean way, path and set of principles, it also has another sense. The fundamental assertion of Daoist philosophy is that there is an ultimate reality, and this is referred to as the Dao, as something formless yet complete, something that is real, ultimate and in some way the basis of all there is.

Dao in narrative environments, while it exploits the senses of path and set of principles and implies learning, does not necessarily imply a belief in an ultimate ground or an ultimate reality; unless that ultimate ground is understood not as a prior grounding but as a simultaneous modality of ‘chaos’ and/or ‘spontaneity’.

References

Di, X. (2016). The Teaching and learning principles of Xueji in the educational practice of the world today. In: Chinese philosophy on teaching and learning: Xueji in the twenty-first century. New York, NY: State University of New York Press, 39–59.

Wilkinson, R. (1997). Introduction. In: Tao te ching by Lao Tzu, translated by Arthur Waley. Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, vii–xix.

Cultural Studies

RELATED TERMS: Feminism and Materialism; Historical Materialism – Marxism; Methodology and Method; Modernity and Coloniality; Postmodernism

For narrative environment design, cultural studies is an important area of research because, like narrative environments, it is inherently interdisciplinary, or perhaps transdisciplinary, and because of its emphasis upon social practices, including spatial practices. There is therefore a lot to learn both from its subject matter, for example, the topics of power, ethnicity and gender, but also the ways in which it seeks to weave together different traditions of thought to come up with novel insights into social practice.

Cultural Studies

Cultural studies is the engaged, self-conscious study of cultures. While cultural studies has drawn upon the ideas of Marxism, feminism, poststructuralism and postmodernism, its discipline base has shifted from literary studies to sociology and ethnography. In addition, its intellectual agenda has also shifted from an interest in popular culture and (mass) media cultural forms to questions of ideology, power, gender and ethnicity. In recent times, its focus has extended to include questions of representation and the formation of cultural identities (Brooker, 2003: viii).

Abrams (1999: 53) notes that one of the chief precursors of modern cultural studies was Roland Barthes. In his book, Mythologies, Barthes analysed the social conventions and codes that confer meanings in a wide range of social practices and topics , such as ornamental cookery, striptease, the poor and the proletariat. Another precursor was the British school of neo-Marxist studies of literature and art, especially in their popular and working-class modes, as an integral part of the general culture. Among the early texts in this movement were Raymond Williams’ Culture and Society (1958) and Richard Hoggart’s The Uses of Literacy (1958). This strand of thinking became institutionalised in the influential Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), founded by Hoggart in 1964 (Abrams,1999: 53)

The establishment of the CCCS in Birmingham in 1964 may mark an historic turning point in the foundation of the field. However, as Stuart Hall stressed, cultural studies was actually initiated elsewhere, in earlier political movements, for example, the New Left, and in subject areas such as English studies, history and sociology. Thus, while the CCCS constitutes one kind of institutional origin, its original curriculum consisted in a diverse range of writings first published a decade earlier (Procter, 2004: 37).

In the United States, the vogue for cultural studies had its roots mainly in the mode of literary and cultural criticism known as new historicism, with its antecedents both in poststructural theorists such as Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault and in the treatment of culture as a set of signifying systems by Clifford Geertz and other cultural anthropologists.

References

Abrams, M.H. (1999). A Glossary of Literary Terms, 7th ed. Boston, MA: Heinle & Heinle.

Brooker, P. (2003). A Glossary of Cultural Theory, 2nd ed. London, UK: Arnold.

Procter, J. (2004). Stuart Hall. London, UK: Routledge.

Cultural Geography

USE for: Human geography, Social geography

RELATED TERMS: Geography; Scape metaphors; Anthropo-Scenes

Those parts of the discipline of geography which are of most value to narrative environment design and analysis are cultural geography, human geography or social geography.

According to Merle Patchett (2010), three eras of cultural geography can be identified: the traditional; the new; and the more-than-representational.

Traditional cultural geography is primarily an American field of scholarship, linked closely to the mid-20c work of Carl Sauer. He took the landscape as the defining unit of geographic study. For Sauer, while cultures and societies both developed out of their landscape, they also shaped their landscape. It is this interaction between the ‘natural’ or ‘physical’ landscape and human communities which creates the ‘cultural landscape’. Cultural geographers following this tradition focused on studying the range of human interventions in transforming the ‘natural’ or ‘physical’ landscape. They were most interested in quantifying material culture, such as buildings and architectures, agricultural technologies and other industries.

The 1960s and 1970s saw a quantitative revolution in geography and interest in cultural geography declined as human geographers turned their attention to developing the discipline as a spatial science. However, during the 1980s, the critique of positivism in geography instigated a renewed interest in cultural geography in North America and particularly in the UK.

This ‘new’ cultural geography had different theoretical assumptions, methods and subjects than those of traditional cultural geography. Rather than focusing on material culture, mostly of non-modern and rural societies, the ‘new’ cultural geographers of the 1980s and 1990s examined culture in contemporary and urban societies, and focused primarily on investigating non-material culture, such as, for example, identity, ideology, power, meaning and values. Among the main themes that were incorporated into ‘new’ cultural geography were colonialism and post-colonialism; postmodernism; popular culture and consumption; gender and sexuality; ‘race’, anti- racism and ethnicity; ideology; language; and media. ‘New’ cultural geographers also drew on a diverse set of theoretical traditions, including Marxism, feminism, post-colonial theory, post-structuralism and psychoanalysis.

In turn, this ‘new’ cultural geography, with its emphasis on identity, is challenged by non-representational theory, as formulated by Nigel Thrift. Instead of studying and representing social relationships, non-representational theory focuses upon practices, i.e. how human and nonhuman formations are enacted or performed, not simply on what is produced. This is a post-structuralist theory drawing in part from the works of Michel Foucault, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and phenomenonologists such as Martin Heidegger. However, it also weaves into its rich tapestry the perspectives of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Bruno Latour and Michel Serres. Non-representational theory’s focus upon hybrid formations parallels the conception of ‘hybrid geographies’ developed by Sarah Whatmore, where she prompted cultural geographers to attend to the ‘more-than-human’ geographies in which we live.

It is perhaps this last approach, with its emphasis on hybrid formations, that is of most interest from a narrative environment perspective, although not in the form of abstract accounts of body-practices and phenomenological accounts of ‘being-in-the-world’ but rather in the form of an approach which enables exploration of the interactions between representations, discourses, material entities, spaces and practices, considered as actants and moments of actantiality.

As Patchett notes, given the diversity of approaches available, cultural geography is perhaps best characterised as a living tradition of disagreements, passions, commitments and enthusiasms.

At a general level, Anderson (2009) contends that cultural geography seeks to explore the intersections of context and culture, exploring how cultural activities and contexts interact, influence and perhaps even become synonymous with one another. The product of the intersection between context and culture is identified as place, constituted by imbroglios of traces, i.e. marks, residues or remnants left in place by cultural life. Traces are most commonly considered as material in nature, including buildings, signs, statues, graffiti, in the form of discernible marks on physical surroundings. Nevertheless, they can also be non-material, including, for example, activities, events, performances or emotions.

Traces tie cultures and geographies together, influencing the identity of both. As a consequence of the constant production of traces, places are dynamic entities in fluid states of transition, as new traces react with existing or older ones to change the meaning and identity of the location.

Cultural geography, by interrogating these traces, their interactions, and repercussions, critically appraises the cultural ideas and preferences motivating them, and the reasons for their significance, popularity and effect. Cultural geographers, therefore, Anderson argues, analyse and interrogate all the agents, activities, ideas and contexts that combine together to leave traces in places.

Again, this resonates with how a narrative environment might be understood.

References

Anderson, J. (2009). Understanding cultural geography: places and traces. London, UK: Routledge.

Patchett, M. (2010). What is cultural geography? Experimental Geography in Practice. Available from https://merlepatchett.wordpress.com/2010/09/03/cultural-geography/ [Accessed 2 September 2016].

Global Challenges – Learning

RELATED TERMS: Global Challenges; Wicked Problems – Wicked Challenges

Jean Dubuffet, La ronde des images, 1977

According to Nicholas Maxwell (2021), humanity is confronted by two great challenges of learning:

  • learning about the universe; and about ourselves and other living things as a part of the universe; and
  • learning how to create civilisation.

The first challenge, Maxwell contends, has been addressed by modern science and technology from the 17th century onwards. The second, how to create civilisation, remains problematic.

[Paraphrasing Maxwell’s challenges in terms of the debates ongoing within European philosophy and as applied in this website to design practices, it might be said that ‘creating civilisation’ is similar to, if not equivalent to, the task of ‘world-building’, in its socio-technical, socio-cultural, socio-economc and socio-ecological dimensions, in which design takes up both material and strategic roles. The question of how world-building relates to the Earth systems (or planetary or global systems) in which it takes place, both in harmony and in disharmony, might be a way of paraphrasing Maxwell’s first challenge – learning about the universe and our (changing, evolving?) place within it.

The challenges are inter-related. They may be posed as the challenge of how to formulate and understand the relationship between socio-genesis (development of civilisation) and techno-genesis (technological development). They both seem to precede each other: techno-genesis arrives through socio-genesis; and socio-genesis arrives through techno-genesis.

This brings to attention the socio-technical character of the human, at once animal-social, governed by a milieu that is ecosystemic, and machinic-technical, governed by a milieu that is economic. The animal-human-machinic ternary seems to open a path to a bio-techno-logic, a form of logic that must, but possibly cannot, reflexively take into account its own complex co-genesis. This is because, as a metaphor, it fails to acknowledge that the bio- and the socio- themselves arise from the eco- and that the eco-, perceived through a technical economy, is always mis-recognised because incomprehensible (cannot be wholly encompassed) within technical, economic terms. Clashes of civilisations are expressed as clashes of technologies in the form of weapons.

Maxwell (2021) acknowledges this duality and/or co-determination of the human when he says that,

“In order to promote human welfare, the problems we fundamentally need to solve are problems we encounter in life, problems of suffering, injustice, avoidable death. These are problems solved by action, by what we do, or refrain from doing. When knowledge or technological know-how is required, as it is in medicine or agriculture, it is always what this knowledge or technology enables us to do that solves the problem [address the challenge, AP], not the knowledge or technology as such. Thus, a kind of inquiry that helps promote human welfare rationally would give intellectual priority to the tasks of (a) articulating, and improving the articulation, of the problems of living [challenges of living, AP] to be solved, and (b) proposing and critically assessing possible solutions [possible responses, AP] — possible actions, policies, political programmes, philosophies of life, ways of living. Solving problems of knowledge and technology [proposing responses to epistemological and technical challenges, AP] would be important, but secondary. But knowledge-inquiry, in giving priority to problems of knowledge [epistemological challenges, AP], violates both (a) and (b). The two most basic rules of reason are violated, in a structural way.”

For Maxwell, modern universities, by prioritising knowledge creation and acquisition, fail to give priority to helping humanity solve challenges of living and thereby also fail to help the public improve its understanding of what our challenges are, and what we need to do about them.

Challenges of a socio-genetic character, because they necessarily imply techno-genetic challenges, are, or become, design issues. However, as is argued in this website, design practices are not solely or primarily problem solving. Perhaps the position could be stated in the following way: ‘wicked problems’ as ‘wicked challenges’, as that which design addresses, are more than simply problems; they relate to ways of living. Design, in one sense, then, seeks to intervene so as to prevent or avert ‘wicked challenges’ from arising, by proposing and enacting, for example, ways of living that seem to pre-empt certain kinds of suffering, particular injustices and avoidable deaths.

A ‘design practice’ orientation, articulated through explicit design pedagogies, within the university may therefore assist in shifting the academy away from its knowledge-creation priorities towards addressing the pressing eco-socio-cultural-techno-systemic matters, which Maxwell characterises as the creation of civilisation. Those civilisational priorities although woven through the practices of modern science and technology are often not prioritised by dominant techno-scientific practices and institutions, geared as they often are to weapons development in international power politics and to the development of instruments which facilitate the domination of ‘nature’ or Erath systems.

References

Maxwell, N.  (2021) How universities have betrayed reason and humanity – and what’s to be done about it, Frontiers in Sustainability, Available at https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frsus.2021.631631/full [Accessed 22 August 2021]

Global Challenges

Related Terms: Wicked Problems – Wicked Challenges; World-Building 

“Yet here’s a spot.” Lady Macbeth, Act 5, Scene 1, The Tragedy of Macbeth, cited in Joyce, Ulysses, p.18

“We are confronted in the twenty-first century with an array of serious problems but among them two immense challenges stand out: on the one hand, those problems presented by carbon technologies, and, on the other hand, those posed by silicon technologies.” (Daniel Ross, 2019)

In the philosophy of design emerging (incompletely) in these web pages, design practices are not defined primarily in terms of their ‘problem-solving’ capabilities. Rather, they are considered as provisional responses to challenges of different kinds and orders, many of which are deemed ‘wicked’ in character. These responses, then, while far from necessarily providing ‘solutions’, nevertheless address the challenges in substantive ways. 

In doing so, they may alleviate some of the stresses within the challenge but they may also change the character of the challenge which remains, albeit in altered form, and which calls for further design responses. Some of these further responses may address the remaining stresses of the initial challenge. Others may address the novel challenges raised by the design response in a world that remains pervaded by challenges and is increasingly defined by the remnants of prior design responses to those challenges which evolve over time. The legacies of some of these designed responses, given the changing terrain, may turn into explicit obstacles rather than having the character of remaining a ‘solution’ to a past challenge.

The question of what design practices and designs ‘do’ is framed by this schema, as a theorised ‘context’ for designing, a context which incorporates relevant design responses to ongoing challenges and the remnants of past design responses that now operate as obstacles to, or misdirections for, emergent designing.

Since theorising and philosophising tend to operate using generalities (part of their limitations as design practices), which are no longer easily discussed as ‘universals’ due to the perceived limitations of European thinking particularly in its historical development in defining a ‘modern’ anthropo-Eurocentric world, discussion of the challenges to which designing may respond have tended to take the form of the outlining the tensions between ‘man’ (the human) and ‘world’ (the natural). 

This ‘general’, ‘universal’ or ‘global’ perspective was seldom in the past adopted in (professional) design practices as the horizon in which designers perceived themselves to operate. However, design practices themselves have expanded to incorporate wider horizons through the development of such fields as participatory design, ecological design and design as policy-making. Nevertheless, a ‘gap’ or an ‘aporia’ remains between ‘design thinking’ and ‘thinking about global challenges’.  

To illustrate this ‘aporia’, let us take, for example, a number of global challenges identified by Bernard Stiegler, as outlined by Daniel Ross (2018: 11) in the Introduction to the English translation of Neganthropocene. They are:

  • the rise of online social networks; 
  • the growth of the ubiquitous interactive screen; 
  • the global financial crisis as symptomatic of the tendency of investment to become increasingly short-term and speculative; 
  • the proliferation of geopolitical crises, terrorism and related forms of individual and collective ‘acting out’; 
  • automation as a threat to a consumerist macro-economic system founded on employment-based purchasing power; 
  • the Anthropocene as an ‘existential threat’ to human existence and the biosphere; and 
  • the unravelling of the consequences of industrially-generated populism, including the entrance into a so-called ‘post-truth’ age where alternative facts proliferate.

Ross and Stiegler in this listing are taking up an explicitly, even if ‘critical’, ‘Western’ or anthropo-Eurocentric positioning in relation to ‘the human’ and ‘the world’. Kevin Rudd similarly specifies a number of global policy domains or global change-drivers which pose significant challenges for the world. However, Rudd’s perspective seeks to understand China’s evolving role in these domains. Rudd cites:

  • China as a powerful global economic actor (geo-economic challenges)
  • the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union (geo-political challenges)
  • the ongoing digital revolution (emerging, disruptive technological challenges)
  • climate change (environmental challenges exacerbated by anthropocentric action)
  • demographic change (the challenges of human groupings and of being-human)

These positionalities, as any other, seek to determine an abstract ‘universality’ of the condition of ‘the world’, but the question remains of the ‘for whom’ these issues are ‘challenges’ to be met.

Each of these challenges or policy domains might be defined as wicked’ or, indeed, as aspects of one great entangled ‘wicked challenge’, that of how to sustain human existence in the world or how to sustain the world grasped through the lens of ‘being-human’: the ‘world-as-human’. Are ‘world’ and ‘human’ permanently and inevitably at odds or are they part of an ongoing ‘evolutionary dialogue’ in which neither is, or can be, ‘aware’? 

Professional design practices may be drawn upon to address aspects of these challenges through their employment by government, in explicit or implicit policy-making and policy implementation, or by business and industry, both in their traditional roles in design for production and in design for consumption. The academic disciplines around teaching and research on designing remains largely associated with professional development for operation within these two major contexts.

The question remains as to whether there is any other role designing (un-professionally, un-disciplinedly) can play in bringing to attention the limits of designing’s own deployment in addressing the ‘global’ challenges in which design practices play, contradictorily, both a minor and a major part. Does designing have a significant part to play, in its participatory forms, in what used to be called ‘civil society’ and in those institutions that are defined as non-governmental and charitable. The problem of the ‘humanitarian’ remains tied up in the complex consequences of the Post-World War Two settlement and the bases of a rights-based system which claims an abstract universality but practices concrete differentiations.

Even if there is such a space for designing, in this context, practices of designing will remain ‘compromised’, their goals necessarily always incomplete, as they must engage with their own pasts and the ongoing challenges with which they must become engaged and through which they must re-define or un-design themselves and the residual world in which we (individuals, citizens, consumers, workers?), or rather we-they, reside.

Reference

Joyce, J. (2000) Ulysses [with an introduction by Declan Kiberd]. London, UK: Penguin Books.

Ross, D. (2018) Introduction. In Stiegler, B. (2018) The Neganthropocene. London, UK: Open Humanities Press, pp.7-32.

Ross, D. (2019) Carbon and silicon: contribution to a critique of political economy. Available at https://internation.world/arguments-on-transition/chapter-10/

Rudd, K. (2024) On Xi Jinping: How X’s Marxist nationalism is shaping China and the world. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

World-as-Milieu

RELATED TERMS: World; World Building

An Antoni Gaudi-esque world-mileiu

Bernard Stiegler, in contemplating the mode of existence of the noetic soul, in other words, the (human) psychic apparatus, is led to consider what is its milieu. Ross (2018: 16) explains that, at first, Stiegler thought it must be language. However, further contemplation made him realise that it is the exteriorised milieu in general, the realm of technics: artefacts, technical artefacts and environmental systems.

In the absence of the exterior milieu, the psychic apparatus consists in nothing but anamnesic memories interwoven with the hypomnesic traces left by those artefacts which form, “an artificial memory and projective mechanism that would serve only to demonstrate, above all, the irreducibility of the exterior.” (Ross, 2018: 16)

As Stiegler (2018: 37) expresses it, “the artefact is the mainspring of hominization, its condition and its fate.”

References

Ross, D. (2018) Introduction. In Stiegler, B. The Neganthropocene. London, UK: Open Humanities Press, pp. 7-32.

Stiegler, B. (2018) The Neganthropocene. London, UK: Open Humanities Press

Wicked Problems – Wicked Challenges

RELATED TERMS: Design of Narrative Environments; Global Challenges; Global Challenges – Learning; Methodology and Method; World

Jaune Quick-To-See Smith

The underlying thesis that is at stake here is that the world, which is conceptualised as a complex narrative environment, a constructed model of reality, is enfolded in a number of wicked challenges, such as those discussed in the post Global Challenges. Design practices, given appropriately developed methodologies and research paradigms, are valid means for addressing but, crucially, not ‘solving’ these complex, inter-related challenges.

Richard Buchanan (1992) revived the discussion of wicked problems and the potential role of design in addressing them by combining the theories of Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber (1973) and Herbert Simon (1973, 1996) with the practice of Ezio Manzini (Gerber, 2018). Rittel and Webber called such problems ‘wicked’, not because they are themselves ethically deplorable but, “in a meaning akin to that of “malignant” (in contrast to “benign”) or “vicious” (like a circle) or “tricky” (like a leprechaun) or “aggressive” (like a lion …).”

Wicked problems, then, are unique problems for which there is no definite formulation, as stakeholders cannot agree on a single definition; proposed solutions are not true-or-false but better or worse; and solutions are numerous and, when implemented, change the way to formulate the (ongoing) problem (Rittel and Webber 1973). In short, wicked problems are about people, vested interests and politics. (Ritchey 2013).

Dubberly and Pangaro (2015) note that, “wicked problems … are essentially political in nature and cannot be “solved” by experts,” while Silvio Lorusso (2023) states, “Every problem is a wicked problem: its resolution is temporary, its paradigm ever-shifting, its focus evolving.”

To cut a long story short, perhaps illegitimately: design is part of an ongoing political conversation about the values that are articulated in social practices that define social goals and which give rise to wicked challenges.

Design Practices and Wicked Challenges

Farrell and Hooker (2013) argue that design is not distinguished from science by characteristically being faced with wicked problems while science deals with ‘tame’ problems (‘puzzle solving’). Rather, they suggest, the features that Rittel and Weber hold to be characteristic of wicked problems derive from three general sources. These sources are common both to science and to design. They are:

  • agent finitude, that is, capacity limitations, such as emergencies of time, cognitive limitations and so on;
  • complexity, that is, uncertainty and irreversibility embedded in the complex-systems nature of the world; and
  • normativity, referring to human values and norms (Pietrzyk, 2022). They play analogous roles in both science and design.

Furthermore, as Farrell and Hooker (2013) make clear, a challenge (or a ‘problem domain’) is neither all fully tame or all fully wicked. The tame/wicked distinction contains a number of different features each of which varies in its degree of tameness and wickedness across challenges.

References

Buchanan, R. (1992) Wicked problems thinking in design, Design Issues, 8 (2), p. Page 5-21. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1511637 (Accessed: 2 May 2019).

Dubberly, H. and Pangaro, P. (2015) How cybernetics connects computing, counterculture, and design, in Blauvelt, A. (ed.) Hippie modernism: the struggle for utopia. Minneapolis, MN: Walker Art Center, pp. 126–141.

Farrell, R. and Hooker, C. (2013) Design, science and wicked problems, Design Studies, 34(6), pp. 681–705. doi: 10.1016/j.destud.2013.05.001.

Gerber, N. (2018) A Critical review of design thinking. Medium. Available at https://medium.com/@niklausgerber/a-critical-review-of-design-thinking-44d8aed89e90 [Accessed 9 September 2021]

Lorusso, S. (2023) What design can’t do: essays on design and disillusion. Eindhoven, NL: Set Margins.

Manzini, E. (2015) Design, when everybody designs: An introduction to design for social innovation. Translated by R. Coad. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Pietrzyk, K. (2022) Wicked problems in architectural research: The Role of research by design, ARENA Journal of Architectural Research, 7(1), pp. 1–16. doi: 10.5334/ajar.296.

Ritchey, T. (2013) Wicked problems: Modelling social messes with morphological analysis, Acta Morphologica Generalis, 2(1), pp. 1–8.

Rittel, H. W. J. and Webber, M. M. (1973) Dilemmas in a general theory of planning, Policy Sciences, 4 (2), pp. 155–169. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4531523 (Accessed: 15 August 2021).

Simon, H. A. (1973) The structure of ill structured problems, Artificial Intelligence, 4(3–4), pp. 181–201. doi: 10.1016/0004-3702(73)90011-8.

Simon, H. (1996) The Sciences of the artificial. 3rd edn. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Further Reading

Crilly, N. (2025) Wicked problems: Flexible characterizations and visual representations, She Ji, 11(1), pp. 31–60. doi: 10.1016/j.sheji.2025.01.002.

Design Thinking

RELATED TERMS:

Design thinking is a human-centric approach to assist businesses to improve their existing products and generate new ideas about possible products and services. It is a creative approach to problem solving. Although not invented by IDEO, it has come to be closely associated with the five-step method developed by that design practice. An evolving approach, its five steps were initially formalised as: Empathise, Define, Ideate, Prototype and Test.

The three criteria applied to determining whether a design is possible are: desirability, from a human point of view; feasibility from a technological perspective; and viability, from an economic perspective. Its key values, therefore, relate to: the human, technology and economy. In the words of Tim Brown, CEO and president of IDEO, a key figure associated with design thinking, it is an “approach to innovation that draws from the designer’s toolkit to integrate the needs of people, the possibilities of technology, and the requirements for business success.”

Note that the design of narrative environments, in orienting itself towards the values of human, narrative and environment, takes the position that design is not simply or narrowly defined as a problem solving process. Rather the outputs of design practices are situated responses to wicked challenges. While they make interventions into those challenges they cannot be said to ‘solve’ them ‘finally’. Rather, they alter the situation, perhaps making improvements but perhaps also raising other challenges in the process.

References

Brown, T. (2008) Design thinking, Harvard Business Review, 86(6), pp. 85–92. Available at https://new-ideo-com.s3.amazonaws.com/assets/files/pdfs/IDEO_HBR_DT_08.pdf [Accessed 15 September 2021]

Di Russo, S. (2016) Understanding the behaviour of design thinking in complex environments [PhD thesis]. Swinburne University of Technology. Available at: https://figshare.swinburne.edu.au/articles/thesis/Understanding_the_behaviour_of_design_thinking_in_complex_environments/26292853?file=47659087 (Accessed: 19 July 2025).

Feminist Avant-Garde Art Practices

RELATED TERMS: Avant-garde movements; Feminism – Material feminism

While themes derived from avant-garde art practice may be of relevance to design practices, of potentially more interest may be those practices of the feminist avant-garde. In confronting an oppressive and conformist patriarchal system prevalent in the in the immediate post-World War Two years, feminist artists developed work that challenged the cult of masculine artistic genius while reclaiming lost ground in the public sphere. They used the media of photography, film, video, and action/performance to explore the female body as a work of art that challenged the ascendancy of the male gaze.

They examined the personal as the political by undermining stereotypical roles as housewife, mother and wife, symbolically enacting the act of breaking free from oppressive confinement while re-articulating the iconography of female eroticism and sexuality, in the process critiquing the reification of the female body while engaging in role play. Through these experimental performances, feminist women artists analysed the dynamics of the perceiving/perceived gendered body considering how, as Schor (2015: 61) argues, women experience a split consciousness: as they internalise the male gaze, they simultaneously perceive themselves as subjects and as objects. A significant part of this perceptual domain involves the critique of the ideal of (feminine) beauty and its dictates as well as highlighting the violence inflicted on women.

Gabriele Schor (2015) argues that the historiography of modern art, in adhering too faithfully to the discursive paradigm of male artistic genius, does a serious disservice to the contribution made by women artists. Women artists played a significant part in the classical avant-gardes, whose protagonists sought to break free from tradition and win social acceptance for a new art. These avant-gardes produced their manifestos, pamphlets and art works during the first third of the 20th century, before and after the First World War, until they were suppressed by fascist and Stalinist forces in Europe.

Peter Burger (1974) adjudged that the avant-garde had failed, a contention that is disputed by Karin Hirdina. Hirdina thinks that the demise of the avant-garde was not a simple endogenous failure but owed more to the fact of their being suppressed. Nevertheless, those representatives of the historic avant-garde who survived exile and oppression could not simply pick up where they left off in the 1920s.

The sense of the term avant-garde changed after World War Two, a period in which it came to cover such art practices as action painting, abstract expressionism, minimalism, op art, pop art, Situationism, Fluxus, Happenings and conceptual art. One of the most striking tendencies in art at this time was the feminist art movement. However, such feminist art is generally not identified as being part of the neo-avant-garde.

This inability to perceive the proximity of ‘feminism’ and ‘avant-garde’ is a weakness of both art history and art criticism. Schor (2015) clearly delineates the feminist art movement’s historic and pioneering achievements, focusing on the art produced during the 1970s. The activities of these women artists manifest all the characteristics of the avant-garde, a concept too closely connected with male artists.

References

Burger, P. (1984). Theory of the avant-garde, translated by Michael Shaw. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Schor, G. et al. (2015). Feminist avant-garde: art of the 1970s, the Sammlung Verbund Collection, Vienna. München: Prestel

Video resources

Rebel Women: The Great Art Fight Back, 22:30 18/06/2018, BBC4, 60 mins. Available from https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/1172DA83?bcast=126923343 [Accessed 10 Mar 2019]